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Abolition of the rule that moneys paid under a mistake of law cannot 
be recovered
by Michael Hales
In October 1998, the House of Lords 
overturned the rule of law that payments 
made under a mistake of law are 
irrecoverable   a rule that had stood for 
over 200 years. This landmark decision 
(Kleinwort Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council 
[1998] 3 WLR 1095) has attracted much 
attention as it has the potential to create 
a flood of litigation over transactions 
which were completed many years ago.
FACTS
Kleinwort Benson entered into a 
number of interest rate swap agreements 
with various local authorities. At the 
time, both Kleinwort Benson and the 
local authorities believed the agreements 
to be valid and binding on the local 
authorities. It was subsequently 
established in Hazell v Hammersmith <&_ 
Fulham London Borough Council [1990] 3 
All ER 33 that these contracts were void 
because the local authorities did not have 
the necessary statutory powers to enter 
into such contracts.
As a result of the Hazell decision, 
Kleinwort Benson wanted to recover the 
sums paid to the local authorities. Where 
such payments had been made less than 
six years previously, Kleinwort Benson 
were able to recover them on the basis 
that there had been total failure of 
consideration, as these claims fell within 
the limitation period. The date of the 
decision in Hazell was irrelevant to these 
claims in so far as calculating the 
limitation period was concerned. Time 
started to run for bringing a claim in the 
usual way, i.e. from the date of payment.
Payments which had been made more 
than six years prior to the Hazell decision 
were assumed to be time barred on the 
basis of the law as it then stood.
In cases of mistake, the limitation 
period does not start to run until the 
mistake is discovered (or with reasonable 
diligence could be discovered)O 7
(s. 32(1 )(c) of the Limitation Act 1980). 
However, it had long been established that 
payments made under a mistake of law, as 
opposed to fact, were irrecoverable.
Kleinwort Benson challenged thiso
principle. Kleinwort Benson brought 
proceedings against four local authorities, 
on the grounds that the payments were 
made under a mistake of law and that the 
limitation period did not begin to run 
against them until the mistake was 
discovered, i.e. the date of the decision in 
Hazell. At first instance, Kleinwort 
Benson failed as the court was bound by 
Court of Appeal authority. However, 
leave was given to appeal directly to the 
House of Lords and their Lordships were 
invited to determine:
(a) whether or not Kleinwort Benson's 
claim established a cause of action in 
mistake of law; and
(b) if it did, whether Kleinwort Benson 
could rely on s. 32(l)(c) of the 
Limitation Act 1980.
By a majority decision, the House of 
Lords decided both points in Kleinwort 
Benson's favour. This article will examine 
the reasoning behind their Lordship's 
judgment.
BACKGROUND TO THE 
RULE
In Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 2 East 469 it 
was held that there is no right of recovery 
for sums paid under a mistake of law. 
Lord Ellenborough in his judgment said:
'Every- man must be taken to be cognisant oj 
the law; otherwise there is no saying to what 
extent the excuse of ignorance might not be 
carried. It would be urged in almost every case.'
This decision was followed in the case
of Brisbane v Dacres (1813) 5 Taunt 143, 
155 157, although the decision in Bilbie 
v Lumley was challenged and full 
arguments were heard on the question of 
whether or not a mistake of law should 
permit recovery. The majority held that 
there was no right of recovery under a 
mistake of law, but did not reach this 
finding on the ignorantia juris non excusat 
maxim, invoked by counsel. In essence, 
the reason behind the court's decision 
was one of policy: where a demand is 
paid vountarily with full knowledge of the 
facts on which the payment is demanded, 
it cannot later be recovered, even if the 
payer's opinion of the law might later be 
different. The court's view was that a 
ruling to the contrary could result in 
great inconvenience. It considered that a 
defendant who receives a demand 
relating to a matter on which the law was 
unclear could choose whether or not to 
litigate the matter or pay the demand; if 
he paid, the transaction wras closed.
CRITICISM OF THE RULE
After Brisbane v Dacres the rule became 
hardened over time. This led to 
criticisms and discussions about its 
reform. The main criticisms were 
perceived as follows:
(a) It allowed the payee to retain a 
payment which he would not, but for 
the mistake, have been entitled to, 
whereas justice appeared to demand 
that the sum should be repaid unless 
there were special circumstances 
justifying its retention.
(b) The distinction between mistakes of 
law and mistakes of fact produced 
results which appeared to be 
capricious. This was also true of the 
exceptions and qualifications to 
which the rule became subject.
(c) As a result of the difficulty in 
drawing a distinction in certain cases
O
between mistakes of law and fact, 
and the temptation for judges to 
manipulate that distinction in order 
to achieve practical justice, the rule 15
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was uncertain and unpredictable in 
its application.
FURTHER ARGUMENTS 
FOR ABROGATION
The rule had been rejected in 
countries throughout the common law 
world as a result of academic work on the 
subject and the effect of two fundamental 
changes in the law:
  recognition that a coherent law of 
restitution founded on the principle of 
unjust enrichment exists; and
  recognition, within that law, of the 
defence of change of position.
Both of these doctrines had been 
accepted by the English courts in Lipkin 
German v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548. 
Lord Goff considered that once this had 
happened, it was inevitable that the 
mistake of law rule should be abrogated 
or reformulated to allow recovery for 
mistakes of law and fact, subject to 
appropriate defences. The old rule could 
not survive but the law needed also to 
evolve appropriate defences to protect 
parties where a repayment would be 
unjust.
A comparison of the law of several 
other jurisdictions revealed that there 
was no necessity for a general exclusion 
of a right to recover under a mistake of 
law and the experience of those other 
systems served to dispel the fears 
expressed in English cases that the 
existence of a right to recover might leado o
to a flood of litigation.o
THE DECISION
The majority of the Lords considered 
that the matter should not be postponed 
for legislation. Despite the Law 
Commission's recommendation for 
legislation in this area, there was no 
indication of when this would occur and 
that recommendation had itself been 
made because of the uncertainty as to 
when the matter would come before the 
House of Lords. By a 3-2 majority their 
Lordships held that the rule that moneys 
paid pursuant to a mistake of law were 
not recoverable no longer forms part of 
English law.
FURTHER ISSUES 
CONSIDERED
The House of Lords also considered 
the following issues.
Payments under a settled 
understanding
It is this issue, coupled with the 
limitation point, which has given rise to 
the concerns expressed in recent 
publications. The question which their 
Lordships considered was whether or not 
a payment made on the basis of a settled 
understanding of the law should be 
recoverable if that law was subsequently 
changed by judicial decision.
The facts of the case gave rise to 
precisely this situation. The parties 
believed the contracts to be valid and that 
the payments were therefore lawfully 
due. Following Hazell, this was shown to 
be incorrect. The local authorities argued 
for these circumstances to provide a 
defence and relied upon the Law 
Commission's recommendations to this 
effect.
The Lords considered the declaratory 
theory of judicial decisions. Judges 
interpret and thereby develop the law 
according to their understanding of it.o o
This understanding is derived from 
statute, precedents, academic writings 
and reported cases. Judicial decisions are 
therefore retrospective in effect. The law 
as declared by the judge is treated as 
always having had that effect. Therefore,J o
the payments made by Kleinwort Benson, 
whilst believed to be lawfully due when 
made, were in fact made under a mistake 
of law, as the law at that date was later 
clarified in Hazell.
Changes in the law made by new 
legislation, however, do not take effect 
retrospectively unless the instrument 
specifically so provides.
Despite the Law made by Commission's 
recommendations that the principle of 
payment under a settled understanding of 
the law should form an exception to the 
rule on recoverability, the majority of the 
House of Lords felt that the matter should 
be left to future legislation. There were 
insufficient grounds for them to impose 
such a restriction on the right to recover 
now. They also considered that the 
defences which would be available would 
adequately protect those parties where a 
repayment would be unjustified.
Honest payment
Is it a defence to a claim for restitution 
of money paid under a mistake of law that 
the defendant honesdy believed that he or 
she was entitled to receive or retain?
This principle was proposed by 
Brennan J in David Securities Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 175 
CLR 353, 399 with a view to providing 
stability for concluded transactions.
Lord Goff, who delivered the leading 
judgment, considered that this 
proposition was too far-reaching. If it was 
accepted, the other defences would cease 
to have any practical relevance and, in 
cases where both parties shared the 
mistake, recovery would be barred. By 
starting with the proposition that money 
paid under a mistake is recoverable on 
the ground that its receipt will lead to the 
defendant's unjust enrichment, this 
defence would exclude recovery in a large 
proportion of cases.
Completed transactions
This issue arose from a footnote to an 
article written by Professor Birks entitled 
'No consideration: Restitution after Void 
Contracts' (1993) 23 University of Western 
Australia Law Review 195, which suggested 
that recovery of money paid under a void 
contract should not be recoverable on the 
ground of mistake of law once the 
contract was fully performed.
On analysis of the proposition, the 
Lords considered that the effect of this 
would be that whilst a payer making a 
series of payments under a contract 
would have a right of recovery accruing 
in respect of each payment on the date 
that each payment was made, once the 
final payment was made the payer would 
lose his right to recover not only the final 
payment, but also all previous payments.
Counsel for Kleinwort Benson argued 
that this proposition was incompatible 
with the ultra vires rule that an ultra vires 
transaction should become binding 
simply because it has been completed. If 
Professor Birks' interpretation were 
correct, the result would be to give effect 
to a contract which public policy had 
declared void. This proposal was 
therefore rejected.
Does s. 32(1 )(c) apply?
This section merely refers to 'mistake' 
and does not specify the type of mistake. 
It was recognised that by finding that the 
section applies equally to mistakes of law 
as to those of fact a cause of action could 
be extended indefinitely. Lord Goff 
specifically mentioned that this area may 
require legislative reform to limit the
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time for bringing claims in such cases, 
indicating that the Law Commission 
might want to address this urgently in 
light of the decision. Clearly, their 
Lordships anticipated the possibility of a 
flood of litigation arising from the case, 
although they declined to impose any 
restrictions on that possibility in their 
judgment, considering that the defences 
available should be sufficient until the 
matter was addressed by legislation.
Defences
Lord Goff mentioned two defences to 
claims for recovery of moneys paid under 
a mistake of law. These were:
(a) change of position; and
(b) settlement or compromise of an 
honest claim.
He also stated that defences would 
evolve as this area of the law developed. 
However, as neither of these defences 
was relevant to the case they received no 
detailed consideration.
The change of position defence was 
accepted in principle by the House of 
Lords in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale. It is 
available where a defendant, acting in 
good faith, has changed his position with 
the result that he or she would suffer an 
injustice if required to repay the moneys. 
The circumstances should be such that 
the injustice to the innocent recipient is 
greater than the injustice caused by 
denying restitution. The recipient would 
have a defence to the extent of his change 
of position. Thus, he might be required 
to repay to the claimant any moneys still 
retained by him. Expenditure of the 
moneys is not, of itself, sufficient to give 
rise to the defence, because the
expenditure might have arisen in the 
ordinary course of events, regardless of 
the unjust enrichment. It seems therefore 
that the expenditure has to be caused by 
the enrichment for the defence to be 
available.
The defence of compromise of an 
honest claim is less well defined. The 
principle underlying this defence seems 
to be that, in agreeing to compromise a 
claim, payers are waiving their rights to 
investigate the merits of the claim and too
ascertain their true legal rights. The payer 
is thereby taken to have assumed the risk 
of making a mistake of law or fact in 
agreeing to the compromise.
Subsequent developments
One other case concerning the 
recovery of money paid under a mistake 
of law has now come before the courts. 
This was Nurdin and Peacock pic v D B 
Ramsden and Co Ltd [1999] All ER941. In 
that case the defendant tried to develop 
causation arguments which differentiated 
between various types of mistake of law. 
However, the court rejected this as too 
narrow an approach. The simple 
question to be answered was: would the 
payment have occurred if the payer had 
not made the mistake of law and, 
possibly, was the mistake directly 
connected to the overpayment and/or to 
the relationship between the payer and 
payee?
Floodgates?
The floodgates argument arises from 
the fact that payments made under a 
settled understanding of the law are now 
recoverable if that law is later changed by 
judicial decision, for a period of six years
from the date of the relevant decision, i.e. 
being the date on which the mistake waso
or could be discovered. This could 
potentially give rise to a flood of litigation 
in respect of matters which are otherwise 
substantially outside any limitation 
period. However, the longer the period 
between completion of the relevant 
transaction and the change in the law, the 
more likely it may be that a defence of 
change of position would succeed.
Generally, the impact of the decision 
may be curbed by the following factors:
(a) The limitation period for claims 
arising under a mistake is governed 
by s. 32(1 )(c) of the Limitation Act 
1980, mentioned above. Abolition 
of the mistake of law rule does not 
start time running for all payments 
ever made under a mistake of law; it 
merely establishes that such a claim 
can now be made. If the mistake 
which induced the payment was 
discovered more than six years ago, a 
claim for recovery will be statute- 
barred.
(b) In many cases, the defence of change 
of position, or the defence of 
settlement or compromise of an 
honest claim, will preclude recovery
(c) The House of Lords expects that 
further defences will evolve in this 
area of the law. ©
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